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Abstract 
Currently, one of the  most influential theories of consciousness is  
Rosenthal’s version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that  the 
HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component 
and a two-component view. We further argue tha t  the two-component 
view is  more consistent with his  effort to  promote HOT as an 
explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. 
Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a 
group of counterexamples that we refer to as  cases of radical confabu- 
lation. We begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why 
we believe i t  i s  open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to 
show tha t  i t  is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. 
Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our 
position, we show t h a t  adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one t h a t  
would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, 
would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. 
According to David Rosenthal’s influential higher-order thought 
(HOT) theory of consciousness, what makes a mental s ta te  
conscious is that  it  is accompanied by a suitable higher-order 
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thought (Rosenthal 1991, 2002, 2004, and 2005).’ More specifi- 
cally, Rosenthal (e.g., 2002, 408-11) hypothesizes that mental 
states are conscious just in case they are the objects of occurent, 
assertoric, seemingly noninferential thoughts to  the effect that  
self is in said state. The relevant kinds of higher-order thoughts 
need not themselves be conscious, but to be suitable in  
Rosenthal’s terms, they should not seem to  be mediated,2 not be 
those tha t  we are  merely disposed to have, and not be those 
that are just imagined, wondered, hoped, or d e ~ i r e d . ~  
Rosenthal has repeatedly made it clear that  his theory is 
proposed as an explanation of, among other things, phenomenal 
consciousness4 (henceforth, p-consciousness). More specifically, 
his principal goal is to explain “what i t  is in virtue of which 
conscious states differ from mental states that aren’t conscious” 
(2005, 3). He has also emphasized that  HOTs, just  like other 
kinds of thoughts, can misrepresent. But several authors (e.g., 
Byrne 1997; Neander 1998; Rowlands 2001; Seager 1999; and 
Levine 2001) have expressed doubts about many claims made 
on behalf of HOT theory, including the claims that  concern p- 
consciousness and misrepresentation. One worry is that, since 
the HOTs themselves are usually unconscious, how could it be 
that they are able to give rise to there being something-it-is-like 
for the subject to  be in a sensory state? A rather hyperbolic way 
of expressing this  concern has  sometimes been called the  
“problem of the rock.” On Goldman’s (1993, 366) version: “A rock 
does not become conscious when someone has a belief about it. 
Why should a first-order psychological state become conscious 
simply by having a belief about it?” A standard response from 
the HOT theorists is that, in order to be a conscious state, the 
object of HOT must be a mental state (Rosenthal 2005; Gennaro, 
2005). Thoughts about rocks don’t make them conscious, 
because rocks aren’t mental states. 
Another worry combines the claims made concerning p- 
consciousness and misrepresentation. This is the suspicion that 
if the content of the first-order state can be represented with 
little or no fidelity by HOTs, then the first-order state seems 
irrelevant to p-consciousness. Yet more vexing, it seems possible 
that HOTs can be the source of p-conscious states, even when 
the first-order states are completely lacking; thus, we are left 
with the seemingly contradictory claims that first-order sensory 
states must be accompanied by HOTs in order for there to be 
states that are p-conscious, along with the claim that HOTs can 
be sufficient for p-consci~usness.~ That the sensory qualities of 
first-order s ta tes  a re  sometimes unnecessary is sometimes 
referred to  as “the problem of targetless higher-order thought” 
(cf. also Kriegel 2003; Janzen Forthcoming). 
Rosenthal partially addresses these worries in his discussion 
of such cases as wine tasting, parafoveal vision, the “filling in” 
of blind spots, dental fear, the-subject-as-target, and confabu- 
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lation. But we believe that his responses remain inadequate. In 
this paper, we argue that the problem of targetless higher-order 
thoughts does pose a serious problem for the HOT theory. We 
differ from other critics, however, in  t ha t  while they focus 
principally on conceptual issues,6 our focus is on explanatory 
adequacy, a failing tha t  we regard as more damaging to 
Rosenthal because he regards HOTS as posits of an empirical 
theory, and i t  is  a theory tha t  has  been adopted, with 
modifications, and promoted by members of the scientific 
~omrnun i ty .~  Our choice of focus is motivated by a desire to 
engage Rosenthal on that field of endeavor for which his theory 
was specially designed. Below, we proceed as follows: section 1 
briefly describes how Rosenthal’s theory attempts to explain p- 
consciousness. Section 2 presents what we call the problem of 
radical confabulation, a condition that can be manifest either 
when first-order content is completely misrepresented or when 
there simply is no relevant first-order state. We intend to show 
that this is an empirical issue for the HOT theory, an issue that 
the theory-in light of its stated purpose--cannot dismiss lightly. 
Section 3 considers some possible responses. 
1. 
Rosenthal’s version of HOT is intended as an empirical theory 
tha t  can, among other things, explain p-consciousness, the 
what-it- is-l ike aspect of conscious experience.8 First ,  he  
emphasizes tha t  not all mental s ta tes  are  conscious; i t  is 
possible for someone to undergo a qualitative or sensory state 
without being conscious of it (Rosenthal 1997, 2002, 2005). Here 
is a recent formulation of the claim: 
To be qualitative, a property need not always occur consciously; it 
must simply be able to occur consciously. Nonmental, physiological 
properties, by contrast, are never conscious. Qualitative properties 
are  potentially conscious, not invariably or essentially conscious. 
(2005, 177) 
Sensory qualities-understood as the properties of certain 
states that  enable us “to discern similarities and differences” 
(e.g., Rosenthal 2005, 202)-as evidenced by subliminal percep- 
tion, peripheral vision, blindsight, the cocktail party effect, 
headaches tha t  come and go during the day, and other such 
phenomena-seem to be able to  occur without p-consciousness 
(Rosenthal 2002, 411h9 They seem to be mental states, not mere 
physiological ones, because their functional roles parallel the 
functional roles of conscious sensory states. The distinction 
applies to both perception and to bodily sensations. As for the 
latter, just  as a conscious pain might cause me to adjust my 
posture, so too would an  unconscious pain cause me to adjust 
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my position while I sleep.’O Rosenthal’s preferred pain example 
is of having headaches for extended periods, even though 
intermittent distractions often make us seemingly unaware of 
the pain. Rosenthal would say that during those nonconscious 
periods, the headache continues to  play a functional role that 
befits a mental state.” As these examples show, sensory qualities 
can be teased apart from what-it-is-like. 
What makes a sensory s ta te  p-conscious, according t o  
Rosenthal, is that it is accompanied by a suitable HOT. He says: 
“accompanying HOTs do result in there being something it is 
like for one to be in states with those sensory qualities” (2002, 
413) .  A recent elaboration of the same claim is: “How I 
represent to myself the sensation I have determines what it’s 
like for me to  have i t .  Differences in my HOTs result in 
differences in what it’s like for me t o  have my qualitative 
states” (2005, 187). 
These statements seem to show that  Rosenthal’s theory 
attempts to explain p-consciousness in terms of two components. 
First, there must be a first-order mental state. In the case of 
perceptual experience, the mental state would be a sensory 
state, one that could perform perceptual functions, even were it 
not conscious. Second, there must be a suitable HOT that  
makes the subject conscious of it. By Rosenthal’s theory, the 
HOTs can’t carry all the weight in explaining p-consciousness. 
As he says, “Strictly speaking, having a HOT cannot of course 
result in a mental state’s being conscious if that mental state 
does not even exist” (1997, 744). This claim seems to  imply that 
for there to be p-consciousness, the HOTs must target a sensory 
state. When they do so, “they make us conscious of ourselves as 
being in certain qualitative states, which results in the subjective 
impression of conscious mental qualities” (Rosenthal 2002, 413). 
We believe this is Rosenthal’s view, properly understood. Let us 
call this account a two-component view of p-consciousness. 
By way of adducing support for this view, Rosenthal asserts 
that  there is a “striking connection” between what HOTs “we 
are able to  have and what sensory qualities we are able to  be 
aware of”  (2002, 413-14; also see 1997, 745). Reasoning by 
inference-to-the-best-explanation, he claims that those HOTs 
are what enable us to  be in conscious states with just those 
sensory qualities. If this line of reasoning is correct, it would 
then seem to  follow that  learning new concepts for, say, 
gustatory and olfactory experiences as when one is learning to  
be a wine taster, usually enables us to  be conscious of more 
fine-grained differences, among sensory qualities.” 
Rosenthal further observes that  what is true for finely 
differentiated qualities is equally true for crudely individuated 
qualities. Taking the sound of an oboe as  an example, he 
hypothesizes that one can construct a scale of HOTs from the 
finely differentiated to  the crudely undifferentiated: we can, for 
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example, move from classification of sensations as “the sound of 
an  oboe,” to classification as “a woodwind,” to some yet more 
generic type of sound, and then-yet more crudely undiffer- 
entiated-to something not even distinctive of sound (perhaps 
jus t  indiscriminate sensory experience). If we continue to 
extrapolate beyond this point, “peel away” the least differen- 
tiated HOTs so t o  speak, then we would be left without any 
conscious experience whatsoever (2002, 413-14). The point is 
that, without a suitable HOT, all we have would be unconscious, 
auditory, mental states. 
An important implication of this apparent two-component 
view is that  i t  allows for the possibility that  a HOT can mis- 
represent the sensory state one is in. And perhaps this should 
not come as  a surprise for, after all, our HOTs, our occurent 
assertions, particularly when they seem to be isolated from 
inferential access to the external world, can go seriously astray. 
Thus, we can form “erroneous” HOTs that make it seem, from 
the first-person perspective, as though we are in sensory states 
we aren’t actually in. One example of this is provided by the 
capacity of HOTs to compensate for the low-resolution sensations 
of parafoveal vision; HOTs can make those sensations seem 
clear and focused (see Rosenthal 1997, 744). In such cases, the 
low-level resolutions of first-order states are misrepresented; 
the first-order sensory state is there, but i t  is made t o  seem 
more distinct and focused than it actually is. 
One among the other examples provided by Rosenthal (2002, 
415) is the phenomenon sometimes known as  dental fear. In 
such cases, dental patients seem to be experiencing pain even 
when nerve damage or anesthetic prevents them from being in 
the actual sensory state.  The usual explanation of this  
phenomenon is that  a fearful or anxious reaction to vibrations 
caused by the drill is what leads one to feel the pain, pain that 
is subjectively indistinguishable from pains felt when the actual 
sensory s ta te  obtains. According to the HOT theory, what 
happens is that  one occurently believes that one is in a pain 
state. If the patient is later told that, for example, an anesthetic 
has already been administered, the patient will cease feeling 
pain. Information thus provided can lead to inferences tha t  
a l ter  the subsequent subjective experiences. But t ha t  
information doesn’t change the patient’s sense of what the prior 
experience was like, for conscious experiences are not altered by 
inferences based upon subsequent information. Rosenthal 
claims that the HOT theory effectively explains this phenome- 
non: the vibrations sensed by the patient serve as first-order 
states, while the subjective feeling of pain is brought about by 
the HOTs having misrepresented those first-order states in a 
way consistent with the patient’s beliefs about the common 
consequences of dentistry. This proposed explanation seems to 
be compatible with a two-component interpretation of HOT. 
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But we must hasten to add that, strictly speaking, Rosenthal’s 
account is open to another interpretati~n.’~ He claims that not 
only can HOTs misrepresent their targets, “they may even be 
about something that does not exist a t  all” (2005, 210). Here 
Rosenthal might be understood as suggesting that even though 
first-order sensory states are frequent causal antecedents for 
HOTs, they are not essential. Wishful thinking, self-deception, 
confabulation, and other like phenomena can also serve as  
causal antecedents and allow for the possibility of HOTs that 
are about notional perceptions or sensations, perceptions or 
sensations that don’t exist. Rosenthal is careful to  emphasize 
various constraints on the degree to  which HOTs can diverge 
from targets (212), but, in the end, he allows that, “there can be 
something it’s like for one to  be in a s ta te  with particular 
mental qualities, even if no such state occurs” (211). HOTs have 
“the last word.” Call this a one-component interpretation of the 
HOT theory; it will be discussed below, in the final section. 
Others have criticized Rosenthal’s position concerning the 
claim that HOTs can target nonexistents and still bring about 
the what-it-is-like of p-consciousness. As Kriegel observes, the 
claim that a person can “be under the impression that she is in 
a conscious state when in reality she is not” is, to say the least, 
“highly counterintuitive” (2007, 49). Rosenthal does not deny 
that  his claim is counterintuitive; instead, he treats this 
reaction as just a prethe~ret ic’~ limitation on our intuitions, a 
limitation that is not as troublesome as it might seem. Pre- 
theoretic experience, after all, is not a good guide to the causal 
antecedents of consciousness of self as being in a qualitative 
state, nor should we expect it to be. 
We stand with Rosenthal on the claim that  pretheoretic 
intuitions should not be taken as cause for excessive worry. 
Moreover, as  we have indicated above, our concern resides 
primarily with explanatory adequacy, not with alleged problems 
of conceptual coherence. I t  is for this reason that  we have 
devoted special attention to  Rosenthal’s examples, for it is here 
that explanatory adequacy can be better assessed. We claim 
that Rosenthal’s examples (e.g., parafoveal vision, tasting wine, 
or listening to  an oboe), a t  least those that can more clearly 
been seen to  serve an explanatory role, presuppose a two- 
component view that suffers from explanatory deficiencies. 
This completes our brief introduction to Rosenthal’s account 
of how p-consciousness can be explained. Despite its brevity, we 
believe i t  accurately identifies the critical features of his 
account. In the next two sections, we argue that his view fails to 
provide a satisfactory explanatory account of the phenomenal 
character of consciousness. Below we will also further consider 
Rosenthal’s claim that his theory does not, strictly speaking, 
require two components. 
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2. 
In allowing for cases of misrepresentation, perhaps an allowance 
that an empirical theory that aspires to appropriate explanatory 
scope must make, Rosenthal has created a problem for himself. 
On the one hand, as mentioned in the previous section, aspects of 
his theory coupled with certain telling examples tend to imply 
that HOTs cannot, by themselves, account for p-consciousness. 
But on the other hand, as we will see, in confabulatory cases the 
HOTs seem, at least sometimes, to have a free hand. In this 
section, we challenge Rosenthal’s account of confabulation. We 
distinguish between nonradical and radical cases of confabula- 
tion and suggest that his view faces what we call the problem of  
radical confabulation. We argue, first, that some of the cases of 
confabulation that  Rosenthal has discussed-including para- 
foveal vision and the “filling-in” of blind spots-are nonradical. 
For others-for example, dental fear-his explanations a re  
problematic in ways that he seems not to recognize. Second, we 
argue that there are radical cases of confabulation that the two- 
component view does not adequately explain. Our contention is 
that, with regard to p-consciousness, in particular the what-it-is- 
like aspect, Rosenthal’s HOT theory is not empirically adequate. 
By nonradical cases of confabulation we mean cases that fall 
under one (or more) of the following three categories: (a) those 
for which a relevant first-order target state clearly exists, (b) 
those for which only a less obviously relevant first-order target 
state exists, and ( c )  those that are perhaps better understood as 
instances of epistemic overconfidence. As for (a), consider 
parafoveal vision. I t  might be said that the HOTs still faithfully 
represent a first-order sensory s ta te ,  but they extrapolate 
erroneously, exaggerating its coverage. The same might be said 
for such phenomena as the “filling-in” of blind spots. No content 
alien to the target state need be added. 
As for (b), consider Rosenthal’s account of dental fear once 
again. According to the two-component view, the vibrations 
sensed by the patient are taken to be first-order states, which 
are misrepresented by the HOTs as pain. (The role of anxiety 
here, while not intuitively or medically surprising, does not 
comfortably fit into the HOT model of misrepresentation.) This 
case is not as straightforward as either parafoveal vision or 
unnoticed blind spots. Misrepresentation seems to be doing 
more here than it is in either of the previous cases. Here it can 
be said that the HOT has a target, but the content of that target 
state seems less relevant to what is represented. Unlike the 
treatment given to parafoveal vision or blind spots, the HOT 
can’t simply extrapolate from first-order content; the HOT must 
actively, creatively misrepresent. Vibrations cum fear are not 
pain,15 but the HOT misrepresents them as pain. Or so it seems, 
on Rosenthal’s description. 
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As for ( c ) ,  what we call epistemic overconfidence, no suffi- 
ciently distinct example can be found within Rosenthal’s work, 
so we here cite a common textbook case: according to Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977), when subjects were invited to choose from a 
variety of panty hose displayed in a row, they preferred those on 
their right. But their preference explanations made no reference 
to spatial  orientation; instead, the subjects spoke of such 
(seemingly phenomenal) qualities as  color and texture. Even 
after being told tha t  the panty hose were identical and they 
were simply showing a preference for those on their right-hand 
sides, subjects tended to defend their confabulations. 
The reason for treating ( c )  as distinct from (a) and (b) is that 
although subjects may report phenomenal qualities, i t  is  
somewhat less clear t ha t  they a re  actually experiencing 
phenomenal qualities. Many empirical studies of confabulation 
do not strongly or  consistently suggest that  what is confabu- 
lated is consciously experienced. Subject reports might seem 
consistent with a HOT explanation-that is, the HOTs might be 
said to misrepresent visual and haptic continuity, leading the 
subject to be conscious of discontinuity. But belief construction 
of this sort need not imply anything a t  all about p-conscious- 
ness, as various clinical and technical definitions of confabulation 
seldom include specific reference to p-consciousness (Hirstein 
So as not to be misunderstood, we should make it clear that  
we agree that Rosenthal should try to explain misrepresentation 
as it might apply to  p-consciousness; after all, as exemplified by 
confabulation, it is a common human phenomenon, exhibited in 
both mundane, nonpathological cases, and in exotic, pathological 
ones. I t  might just  be a basic feature of the way we form and 
report beliefs, a form of epistemic overconfidence (Hirstein 
2005; Lane 2006). As for the panty hose case, if we put the 
worries mentioned above aside, the subjects might be reporting 
judgments that  are grounded in p-consciousness in a way that 
is  consistent with what Rosenthal says about HOT theory: 
despite being wrong about the cause of their behavior, they 
could be said to  be conscious of color in virtue of having HOTs 
that  target certain sensory states, but said states seem to be 
radically misrepresented, for they a re  making distinctions 
where there are  no distinctions to be made. In this case, the 
first-order state does not seem to carry any of the content that  
is being represented by the HOT, at least none of the content 
t ha t  enables the making of distinctions. So i t  is unlike 
parafoveal vision tha t  simply builds upon what is  already 
available to  it. I t  “sees” differences where there are none to be 
seen. I t  doesn’t misrepresent by indicating “more of the same”; 
rather,  i t  misrepresents by indicating “difference despite 
sensory continuity.” As with dental fear, we seem to have a case 
wherein HOTs can be said to  have targets, but if we presuppose 
2005, 187-203).16 
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t ha t  the subjects’ reports a re  reliable and literal, their  p- 
consciousness includes sensory qualities (i.e., the discontinuities 
in color and texture) that don’t allow for the type of nonradical 
extrapolation available to the cases considered above. 
We have suggested tha t  the two-component view, when 
applied t o  dental fear and to the panty hose cases, misrepre- 
sents in ways that create a constructivist burden for HOTS, a 
burden not shared by blind spot or parafoveal vision cases. But 
we will not press the point closely here because we believe that 
neither represents a substantial challenge for HOT theory. For 
example, dental fear, since there is a target state,  and since 
“fear” and “vibration” bear significant conceptual similarities to 
“pain,” a plausible, relatively straightforward defense of HOT 
can certainly be managed: the relevant HOT does target first- 
order sensory states, but these states are misnamed. Fear cum 
vibration is unpleasant, as is pain; perhaps patients are just  
misnaming their  unpleasant experiences in  the way tha t  
subjects who can distinguish among colors readily enough 
might incorrectly name them. As for the Nisbett and Wilson 
panty hose case, perhaps an  argument could be made tha t  
despite references to  p-consciousness, there is no evidence that 
the subjects actually had such experiences. Perhaps their  
behavior can be entirely treated at the doxastic 1 e ~ e l . l ~  We are 
not fully convinced that such is the case, but we choose to avoid 
these complexities for now. Instead, we use these constructivist 
examples as a bridge or transition to examples that we believe 
serve as  yet more serious challenges t o  the explanatory 
ambitions of HOT. 
Accordingly, we now turn to radical confabulation, by which 
we mean cases of radical misrepresentation, radical in that (a) 
there is good reason to say that there simply is no target, yet 
(b) there are robust grounds for claiming that p-consciousness 
actually obtains. Rosenthal’s theory not only allows for mis- 
representation by extrapolation from target content and by 
creative additions to target content, as we have indicated above, 
it also allows for the possibility of radical misrepresentation: 
that  is, cases in which those first-order sensory states simply 
don’t exist (e.g., 2004, 31). However, he does not believe that  
this poses serious problems for his theory. Addressing this issue, 
Rosenthal writes: 
Suppose my higher-order awareness is of a state with property P ,  
but the target isn’t P ,  but rather Q .  We could say that the higher- 
order awareness misrepresents the target, but we could equally 
well say that it’s an awareness of a state that doesn’t occur. The 
more dramatic the misrepresentation, the greater the temptation 
to say the target is absent; but it’s plainly open in any such case to 
say either. The two kinds of cases, moreover, should occasion the 
same kinds of phenomenological perplexities, if any. A higher-order 
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awareness of a P state  without any P state  would be subjectively 
the same whether or  not a Q state occurs. The first-order state can 
contribute nothing to phenomenology a p a r t  from the  way we’re 
conscious of it (2004, 32).’* 
Rosenthal seems to be anticipating our distinction, or like 
distinctions, between nonradical and radical cases of confabu- 
lation and downplaying its significance. On one reading of this 
passage, i t  might seem tha t  Rosenthal is trying to distance 
himself from a two-component interpretation of HOT. But we 
believe his attempt to downplay the possibility of targetless 
HOTs is significant. Note that he writes: “We could say that the 
higher-order awareness misrepresents the target, but we could 
equally well say that it’s an  awareness of a state that  doesn’t 
occur. The more dramatic the misrepresentation, the greater the 
temptation to say the target is absent, but it’s plainly open in 
any such case t o  say either” (Rosenthal 2004, 32; emphasis 
added). We believe that Rosenthal can make such a claim only 
because he deals with nonradical cases. The radical cases, we 
argue, a re  importantly different: they show tha t  i t  is  not 
“plainly open . . . to  say either.”lg 
Case 1. 
Consider the case of Anton’s Syndrome,20 in  particular, the 
denial of blindness (Hirstein 2005, 14546). Typically those who 
suffer from Anton’s Syndrome (AS) have two brain lesions: one 
that affects vision and another that affects the ability to know 
whether or not they can see. The result is that  although their 
neural mechanism cannot process visual stimulation, they 
believe they can, and they can skillfully confabulate when their 
failure t o  see things accurately is called to their  attention. 
Confidence in confabulations is not shaken even when the 
patients are interacting with the environment; naturally they 
bump into things and encounter other problems, but  they 
confabulate anyway, for example, by complaining that the room 
is too dark, or that  they’re not wearing their glasses, or tha t  
they’re not familiar with the environment. 
Here, although we seem to have a n  example of HOTs 
without sensory experience, a defender of HOT might, as with 
the case cited above, attempt to restrict explanation to the 
doxastic level. But a yet more striking characteristic of AS is 
tha t  patients “often have visual hallucinations ( that  can be 
either simple or complex).” Typically, hallucinations, as opposed 
to mere confabulations, are said to have three characteristics:21 
(a) they are vivid and immediate, like perceptions; (b) they are 
experienced as though external to the person; and ( c )  they are 
not reassessed as imagery, just  because evidence suggesting 
they should be so reassessed is provided. These three charac- 
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teristics might also be applicable to confabulatory cases 
wherein relevant first-order target states exist; they might, 
arguably, even be applicable to such cases wherein a less 
obviously relevant first-order target state exists.22 But clearly 
they are  not applicable to cases of epistemic overconfidence. 
And the problem posed for HOT is that (a), (b), and (c) seem to 
obtain, as clear indicators of p-consciousness, even when the 
subject suffers from AS. 
In one case, for example, a patient with AS not only reported 
hallucinations (while suffering from delirium t r e m e n ~ ) , ~ ~  he also 
believed his vision had been restored to the extent that he could 
provide descriptions of his environment (Swartz and Brust 
1984). Unlike those cases for which defenders of HOT might be 
better able to  restrict explanation to doxastic problems, here we 
have better evidence t h a t  p-consciousness, in the form of 
substantial visual experiences actually occurs. Here then we 
seem to have a case of radical confabulation for which i t  is 
difficult t o  deny that p-consciousness obtains, but for which the 
HOT seems to be doing all the work. In a word, the HOT seems 
to be sufficient for p-consciousness. This violates the two- 
component interpretation of Rosenthal’s view; it does not seem 
“plainly open” to interpretation as target misrepresentation. 
The problem here is that  not only are the HOTs misrepre- 
senting and confabulating, as in the case of dental fear or in the 
case of choosing panty hose, there seem to  be grounds for saying 
there is no mental state to be targeted; yet the subject still seems 
capable of p-consciousness. In the cases of AS accompanied by 
visual hallucinations, although the patient claims to have visual 
experiences, apparently the HOTs cannot be target ing the 
sensory states in question. 
A defender of HOT theory might want to  claim that here too 
we have insufficient evidence for the existence of p-consciousness. 
Perhaps explanation can once again be handled by reference to 
intentional states alone. But we would regard such a response 
as ad hoc, because the diagnosis of hallucination presupposes p- 
consciousness, and tha t  diagnosis is  made on independent, 
medical grounds. Notice we are not suggesting that the reports 
of empirical scientists should be taken at face value. But we are 
claiming that the burden to correct a diagnosis rests with the 
critic who encounters an anomalous case that does not conform 
to theory expectations. Moreover, HOT is designed to  explain 
empirical phenomena, s o  unless a principled reason can be 
given to reject the standard scientific description, the diagnosis 
and its conceptual implications should stand. 
What we are claiming is that  i f  Rosenthal’s version of HOT 
is both intended as an explanation of p-consciousness and as 
allowing for the possibility of radical confabulation, then it flirts 
with inconsistency. On the one hand, i t  seems t o  imply tha t  
doxastic s ta tes  alone-even HOTS-are insufficient as a n  
79 
Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang 
explanation of consciousness. The other mental states, in this 
instance the first-order sensory states, seem to be necessary. 
But on the other hand, the HOT theory also seems anxious to 
allow for radical confabulation, and this makes the first-order 
sensory states unnecessary. We further contend tha t  radical 
cases are not ambiguous in such a way as to support Rosenthal’s 
claim that they could “plainly” be reinterpreted as instances of 
target misrepresentation. 
This is not a result that  Rosenthal could want, for even he 
seems to  share the widespread intuition that intentional states, 
alone, simply don’t have the resources for enabling phenomenal 
consciousness (1997, 740; 2002, 413). It  is “being able to form 
intentional states about certain sensory qualities” that results 
in “our being able to experience those qualities consciously” 
(2002, 413). But here there are no sensory qualities that can be 
intentionally targeted. At least for the radical cases, it  seems to 
be inconsistent to allow for the possibility of erroneous HOTS 
alone giving rise to something-it-is-like for the subject to  be in a 
sensory state. 
One immediate response would be t o  treat  it as an  excep- 
tional case, something that is beyond the reach of the existing 
version of the theory.24 But actually this might not be such an 
exceptional case. There are other examples in the literature on 
pathologies that suggest that p-consciousness can occur despite 
the absence of the sort of target that  is required by the HOT 
theory. To cite just two more cases: 
Case 2. 
Congenitally deaf patients who suffer from schizophrenia often 
claim to hear voices (see Atkinson 2006). Schizophrenia is as 
common among the deaf as it is among the general population, 
and approximately half of these patients report hearing voices. 
The voices are described as being similar to regular speech, in 
tha t  they can vary along multiple dimensions, including 
loudness, pitch, content, and complexity. Moreover, voices are 
often personified such tha t  the patients can detect accent, 
gender, and degree of familiarity. I t  must be admitted that there 
are many contentious issues concerning the proper interpre- 
tation of these data; for example, it is not altogether clear how 
we should understand hallucination descriptions that use signs 
glossed in English as “Heard,” or “Voices.” But at least this is an 
indication that cases of AS accompanied by hallucinations are 
not so  exceptional as they might seem. In some respects, the 
phenomenon of deaf-hearing might be even more problematic 
for Rosenthal because these patients don’t believe that they can 
hear. They claim to hear, despite not believing that  they have 
the capacity for hearing. On the face of i t ,  they seem t o  be 
lacking an essential prerequisite for formation of the relevant 
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HOT-the belief that they are capable of hearing. Nevertheless, 
they do, with the onset of schizophrenia, begin to  hear voices. 
Contrast this with Rosenthal’s wine tasting example. In that 
case, it  is alleged that learning new concepts enables one to be 
conscious of fine-grained differences among sensory qualities. 
Concept learning takes a leadership role. The same can be said 
concerning Rosenthal’s thought-experiment wherein it is alleged 
that by systematically stripping away concepts, “the sound of an 
oboe” can be reduced to indiscriminate sensory experience. In 
these cases, concepts are enablers. But when the deaf suddenly 
start to hear, the concepts don’t lead or enable, at least not in 
the way that it seems to be with wine or oboes. When the deaf 
begin to hear, their concepts seem capable of nothing more than 
merely responding t o  phenomena that  abruptly assert them- 
selves onto the scene. And this is especially odd because the 
phenomena are in direct conflict with previously held beliefs 
concerning what the agent is capable of experiencing. 
Case 3. 
Ramachandran discusses the cases of phantom limb patients 
who experience involuntary clenching spasms, such that nails 
can be felt digging into the palm, spasms that inflict great pain 
tha t  the patient cannot relieve (see Ramachandran 1998; 
Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996). In order to 
provide therapeutic assistance to these patients, Ramachandran 
designed a mirror-box, a box that contains a centrally placed, 
vertical mirror, a box without a top or front. Patients can place 
their existing hands into the box, thereby creating the illusion 
that  the phantom has been resurrected. As a consequence of 
this “resurrection,” six out of ten patients claimed they could 
now feel the phantoms move and four of the ten were able to 
unclench their the hands, thereby relieving the pain. 
On at  least one description of such cases, patients who don’t 
believe in the resurrection of the phantom hand are suddenly 
able to exercise control over it and eliminate select p-conscious 
experience (i.e., the nails digging into the palm). That is, there 
seems to be no intentional target, at least no obvious sensory 
state available for targeting. And there is no belief tha t  the 
hand has been resurrected. Yet p-consciousness is nonetheless 
t r an~fo rmed .~~  
Once again, contrast this with Rosenthal’s wine and oboe 
examples: were occurent, assertoric, noninferential thoughts 
playing a significant explanatory role in the generation of p- 
consciousness, one might reasonably expect conceptual addition 
or subtraction to be leading the way. But here the phenomenon 
-the illusion that the hand has been resurrected-trumps. At 
best, if there are accompanying HOTS, they seem to  just follow 
the illusion, no matter where it leads.26 
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Although it might be possible for the HOT theory to accom- 
modate such phenomena, still these cases differ strikingly from 
Rosenthal’s paradigmatic cases. And those paradigm cases are 
what provide the HOT theory with much of its initial plausi- 
bility. They suggest a significant explanatory role for HOTs. In 
our cases, however, i t  seems difficult, or a t  least pointless, to 
leave explanatory room for HOTs. 
On our view, in light of the cases described above, Rosenthal 
would seem to be hard pressed to continue to proclaim tha t  
HOT is a promising empirical theory. The point is not that good 
theories don’t encounter anomalies; they do. The point is that  
HOT has not a s  yet established any significant empirical 
credentials. Examples like that of wine tasting are suggestive, 
but suggestive evidence of this sort is a far cry from the sort of 
evidence that growing empirical theories require. Such theories 
require the evidence provided by confirmed predictions or 
evidence provided when attempts t o  falsify fail. Given tha t  
existing evidence is no more than  weakly suggestive, these 
anomalous cases would seem to constitute a serious threat to 
all attempts to invoke HOTs as part of the explanans for any 
given instance of p-consciousness. 
In  the next section, we consider some further possible 
responses to our criticisms of HOT theory. We argue that none 
of them succeed in alleviating the worries raised by the problem 
of radical confabulation. 
3. 
In this section, the following objections are considered: (1) the 
confabulatory cases can be reinterpreted; (2) the counterexamples 
exaggerate the relevance of peripheral or input mechanisms; (3) 
HOTs might be targeting something mental, even if that some- 
thing is not a first-order mental state; (4) p-consciousness might 
fail to occur in the proposed counterexamples; and, (5) Rosenthal 
could opt for  a disjunctive strategy, one tha t  allows for the 
possibility tha t  HOTs are  sufficient. We argue tha t  each of 
these fails. 
(1) Reinterpreting cases of confabulation? A first response 
tha t  might be attempted on behalf of Rosenthal is t o  t ry  to 
reinterpret some cases of confabulation. For example, as for 
dental fear, a case that we treat as problematic, a defender of the 
HOT theory might try to argue that it is significantly analogous 
to  standard instances of misrepresentation, like the manner in 
which similarity of shape, impaired vision, and distance might 
cause one to mistake a cow for a horse. Fear and vibration-or 
perhaps a philosopher should write “fear and trembling”-might 
be relevantly analogous to shape and impaired vision. 
But even if this attempt succeeds, it  still leaves us to wonder 
on jus t  what grounds this  can be called a n  account of p- 
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consciousness. For the less contentious cases, like parafoveal 
vision, at least there is a relevant, substantial, first-order sensory 
state with which to work. Perhaps, as we have suggested above, 
some similar account could be developed for dental fear: the 
relevant HOTs in this instance would actually be about fear 
and vibration, but these sensations would then be misnamed. 
Because fear cum vibration is unpleasant, just as is pain, such 
misnaming might be as common as is the misnaming of similar 
colors or sounds. We submit tha t  dental patients, generally 
speaking, are not proficient at naming the different types of 
experienced unpleasantness that they undergo, so they tend to 
use a catchall term like “pain.” 
AS accompanied by hallucinations, however, presents a much 
more substantial worry by eliminating even the possibility of an 
analogue to shape, impaired vision, misnaming, and so forth. In 
some respects it seems that Rosenthal has not yet put to rest 
the “problem of the rock.” Our concern is not that “beliefs” don’t 
seem to  be the sort of entity that could explain consciousness; 
actually, we suspect that  worries about explanatory gaps and 
hard problems are excessively motivated by the desire to “feel” 
that one understands, and this is an  inappropriate expectation 
t o  hold concerning empirical explanations. As Hempel (1965, 
256-58) once observed in a similar context, the desire to feel 
that we “understand” is just to confuse “empathetic familiarity” 
with theory-based or cognitive understanding. 
Doxastic states may well have all that  is required to cause 
what-it-is-like, but once we leave behind paradigmatic cases 
like wine tasting and oboe listening-cases that imply a two- 
component view-it is not at all clear that such states are able 
to play an  explanatory role. Although at first glance i t  might 
appear tha t  AS accompanied by hallucinations might lend 
support t o  a one-component view, such is not necessarily the 
case. One can describe the phenomenon in terms consistent 
with the view that HOTs alone are sufficient for what-it-is-like, 
but one can just as easily describe it in terms compatible with 
the view tha t  HOTs are  either irrelevant or a n  outcome of 
events over which they yield no control-for example, despite 
the belief tha t  one can’t see, one suddenly starts t o  see, a n  
effect t ha t  sets the confabulatory machinery of HOTs into 
motion. Concerning the relationship between conceptual consis- 
tency and explanatory adequacy, we will have more to say 
below. 
Par t  of the confusion concerning the explanatory role of 
HOTs is, we submit, that in his more recent discussions of HOT 
Rosenthal tends t o  minimize ta lk  of causal  connection^,^' 
preferring to use the term “accompany.” But if “accompany” is 
interpreted as “correlation,” something that is not uncommon 
for Rosenthal (e.g., 2002, 413), then i t  is not at all clear just  
what kind of explanation can be forthcoming. Accidental correla- 
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tions are cheap; hence, explanatorily useless. They are the type 
of thing tha t  statistics faculty like t o  entertain their under- 
graduates with, for example, as  with citing instances of the 
correlation between stock market trends and women’s skirt  
lengths. Unfortunately, Rosenthal has not yet clearly indicated 
just what kind of nonaccidental correlations are involved here,2s 
and that is what we would need were “accompany” to play an 
explanatory role. 
More substantial interpretations may well be forthcoming, 
but at least at this stage in the development of the HOT theory 
we have good grounds for asking in what sense it could be that 
HOTs “accompany” when either they wholly misrepresent what 
they are apparently about, or when they target n o n e x i s t e n t ~ . ~ ~  
What is, at minimum, required is a more systematic account of 
“accompany,” either when we should expect the two components 
to correlate, and how or when we should expect that they won’t, 
and what consequences will follow. Rosenthal doesn’t intend 
that “accompany” should apply to cases wherein HOTs inten- 
tionally target nonexi~ten ts ,~~ but the worry here, for those of us 
concerned with explanation that is applicable to  the empirical 
sciences, is that  “accompanyn can be dismissed too easily, in an 
ad hoc fashion. And if this is the case, then Rosenthal’s attempt 
to avoid conceptual issues pertaining to  the hard problems and 
explanatory gaps fails because his avoidance is justified by the 
claim tha t  he is  concerned with scientific explanation, but 
scientific explanation can’t get off the ground if it  allows for the 
ad hoc and relies upon the post hoc. 
(2) Exaggerated emphasis on peripheral or input mechan- 
isms? A defender of HOT might also proclaim that our cases of 
radical confabulation only seem to challenge HOT because we 
focus unduly on sensory input mechanisms. The argument 
might go tha t  people can be blind o r  deaf in different ways. 
Perhaps it could be said that although they have lost sensory 
contact with the world, their  internal  sensory capabilities 
remain intact. Perhaps it could be argued that these internal 
sensory mechanisms are  mental  s ta tes  t ha t  can serve as 
appropriate HOT targets. 
To take the cases of AS as examples, perhaps i t  could be 
said that patients are just mistaking visual imagery for actual 
vision. I t  might then be open t o  a defender of HOT theory to 
claim that  visual imagery provides the target for a HOT. But 
most clinical neurologists believe this is not the case because 
the damaged areas are precisely those areas that  are needed 
for both imagery and actual vision.31 Still, clinical cases vary 
greatly, so perhaps the  general  point does need to be 
addressed. 
Rosenthal says, “TO be qualitative, a property need not 
always occur consciously; i t  must simply be able to occur 
consciously. Nonmental, physiological properties, by contrast, 
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are never conscious” (2005, 177). Rosenthal defines sensory 
s ta tes  as possessing properties tha t  enable us to make 
distinctions and form classifications, s ta tes  t ha t  have the 
potential to  be conscious. “A state’s having qualitative character 
... is solely a matter of the role that state plays in perceiving” 
(Rosenthal 2205, 13). The first thing to observe here is tha t  
even if certain nonconscious, neurophysiological states obtain 
independently of sensory contact with the world, since they are 
playing no perceptual role, it is by no means obvious that those 
states can count as mental, something that would be required 
on Rosenthal’s view.32 What’s more, identifying something as 
mental because it has the potential to  be conscious seems to 
risk flirtation with higher-order dispositional views,33 views that 
Rosenthal rejects.34 
A third thing to  observe is that, according to R ~ s e n t h a l , ~ ~  if 
relevant perceptual roles never existed, we would have no 
grounds for the ascription of mental qualities. I t  would then 
seem to  follow that at least for the congenitally blind victims of 
AS, we would lack adequate grounds for the ascription of 
relevant, nonconscious, sensory states. Homomorphism theory 
doesn’t require the persistent function of perceptual roles, but it 
does require that those roles were previously performed. 
A fourth thing to  observe is that  once sensory contact with 
the world has been lost, the sense in which it can be said that 
we make distinctions and form classifications is less clear. 
During dream states,  for example, when sensory input is  
blocked, although internal perception proceeds and emotions 
might be enhanced, cognitive functions a re  greatly altered 
(Hobson 2007, 106-7). Perhaps i t  could still be argued tha t  
first-order sensory distinctions and classifications are still being 
made, but when one hallucinates (as in sensory deprivation) or 
when one dreams, since cognitive functions are altered, it is not 
clear just what role HOTs are able to play in the generation of 
conscious states.  At the very least  we would need further 
discussion concerning the nature and role of HOTs when the 
senses are deprived or when the agent is asleep. Even worse for 
the HOT theorist, if internal perception is unimpaired but 
cognition is distorted, it  might be that  Rosenthal and others 
would be pushed toward a higher-order perception, o r  inner 
sense, view of consciousness. And that is a view that Rosenthal 
(2005, 340) adamantly rejects. 
(3) Might HOTs still be targeting something mental, even if 
there is no first-order state? After all, on Rosenthal’s account, a 
state’s being conscious consists in one’s being conscious of self 
as being in that state. Rosenthal writes: “Each HOT represents 
i ts  target state as belonging t o  some individual” (2005, 347). 
Perhaps then p-consciousness could still be said to  result from 
the targeting of something mental. But instead of a s ta te  
serving as the target, a subject would so serve. 
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But even were we to grant that either state or subject could 
suffice, it  is not clear that  the theory can stand, at least not on 
Rosenthal’s terms. Concerning the central notion of self he 
writes: “A minimal concept of self will suffice for reference to 
oneself; no more is needed than a concept that  allows distin- 
guishing between oneself and other things. Such a minimal 
concept need not specify what sort of thing the self is. Thus it 
need not imply that the self has some special sort of unity, or is 
a center of consciousness, or is transparent, or  even that it has 
mental properties” (1997, 741; emphasis added). Rosenthal also 
writes tha t  “the single subject which we’re conscious of our 
conscious states as belonging to  may not actually exist” (2005, 
348). In other words, according to HOT, neither targeted state 
nor subject need actually exist. 
If there is no target sensory state, nor any self with mental 
properties, then just what is left to “accompany” the HOT? We 
know that a rock would be insufficient. But when we consider 
Rosenthal’s minimalist, even eliminativist, understanding of 
self, it isn’t clear that there is enough substance here to enable 
p-consciousness, that  is, unless the HOT really is doing all the 
work, unless HOTs really are sufficient for what-it-is-like. 
Alternatively, he might t ry  to incorporate a more robust 
sense of self. But doubtless such a response would resurrect old 
worries about HOT, particularly those raised by Dretske (1995) 
and others who are  concerned tha t  HOT theory excludes 
prelinguistic infants, feral children, and nonhuman animals 
from the community of creatures capable of phenomenal 
consciousness. Even if Rosenthal were to bite this bullet, i t  
would by no means be an easy task to  formulate a theoretically 
feasible concept of self that  has the resources to play the role 
that he hopes for within HOT theory. 
(4) Might it be that HOTs are sufficient because p-conscious- 
ness doesn’t occur in the alleged counterexamples? Rosenthal 
might concede that for cases of radical confabulation the first- 
order targets a re  indeed missing, while at the same time 
denying tha t  p-consciousness occurs. He could claim tha t  
subjects’ first-person reports about p-consciousness reflect 
nothing but epistemic overconfidence. 
But, as we observed above, the problem here would be that 
Rosenthal would have t o  deny the neuroscience and clinical 
standards for interpreting patient behavior (including verbal 
behavior) as indicating the actual experience of p-consciousness. 
This might be possible, but the burden for rejection of standard 
empirical characterizations rests with proponents of the new 
explanatory theory; in this instance, with the proponents of 
HOT. Presumably, were this  to succeed, i t  would require a 
significant deflationary view of p-consciousness, a view tha t  
some others have already found appealing. 
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Especially noteworthy in this regard is Dennett (e.g., 1991, 
369-41 l), who has  invested much effort toward deflating 
standard characterizations of p-consciousness. But, despite the 
many similarities between their two positions, Dennett (e.g., 
1991, 362-68) believes intentional states alone (understood as 
beliefs, or interpretations, or as memeplexes) are sufficient to 
explain consciousness. He sees no need t o  posit two distinct 
mental levels; even when he turns  his attention to 
consciousness, he takes beliefs to be the “pretheoretical data, 
the quod erat explicatum” (2005, 44-45). 
Were Rosenthal to recast HOT in this form, he might be 
better positioned to seek an  explanatory scope tha t  does not 
omit cases of radical c~nfabu la t ion .~~  Simplifying somewhat, if 
HOTs carried all of the load, all of the time, then there would 
be no need to mark distinctions between radical and nonradical, 
no need to mark distinctions between mere epistemic over- 
confidence and cases in which robust p-consciousness actually 
occurs. However, moving in that direction would mean giving up 
any role for first-order mental states, which would imply that 
we are never really in certain folk-psychological states that  we 
take ourselves to  be in; it would commit Rosenthal to denial of 
a distinction between the appearance and reality of conscious- 
ness. Obviously, such moves would mark a substantial departure 
from Rosenthal’s current position (e.g., 2005, 231-56). Still, the 
advantage of such moves would be that Rosenthal would not be 
troubled by differences between ordinary instances wherein 
HOTs make self aware of being in a certain state and instances 
of radical confabulation. On Dennett’s view, there simply is no 
substantial difference-in a sense, all cases are cases of radical 
confabulation because we are never in the states that  we take 
ourselves to  be in. 
But a move in this direction would also be rife with problems. 
Recall, for example, the manner in which a simple trick with 
mirrors can lead to the “resurrection” of a phantom hand. What 
might a theory that puts all explanatory weight onto HOTs be 
able t o  say about this? Patients don’t report occurent beliefs 
that their hands are resurrected. Quite the opposite. Neverthe- 
less, the therapy works. I t  seems that Rosenthal (or Dennett) 
would have to posit a nonconscious belief in  the hand’s 
resurrection, a belief that  conflicts with the conscious belief 
that no such thing is possible. We won’t pursue this matter any 
further here, beyond just to say that Rosenthal would owe us a 
principled account of how conflicting HOTs are, or can be, 
adjudicated. Although according to the HOT theory, most HOTs 
are  nonconscious, still the theory does allow for HOTs t o  be 
conscious, when they themselves are targeted by yet higher- 
order thoughts. Accordingly, what we need is an account that  
explains why the nonconscious HOT-which is nothing more 
than a theoretical posit-wields more influence than the con- 
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scious, reportable HOT-which is something tha t  we have 
theory-independent evidence for. 
One additional, related problem that  we will mention, but 
reserve full development for another time, is what we term the 
problem of “conceptual inadequacy.” Consider the case of people 
who suffer from pain asymbolia syndrome: although they claim 
t o  be experiencing pain, they say they don’t care, tha t  they 
seem to “float above” the pain.37 Our worry, baldly stated, is that 
no society’s folk psychology contains the concept of pains that 
one can “float above.” For those people who know nothing of 
pain studies, who suddenly find themselves afflicted with pain 
asymbolia, the phenomenon just asserts itself without warning. 
These people wouldn’t have the conceptual resources with 
which to  form the relevant HOT. They are dramatically unlike 
people who cultivate an  appreciation of wine, color, or music. 
The worry then for those who would adopt a move in  this  
direction-that is, placing yet greater explanatory weight on 
beliefs or  on the HOT-is that in cases like pain asymbolia, the 
higher-order thought seems irrelevant, for it lacks the conceptual 
resources whereby such a distinction could be made. Folk 
psychology doesn’t distinguish between pains tha t  we must 
wallow in and pains that we can float above. 
(5) Finally, one might defend the HOT theory by suggesting 
a disjunct ive  strategy. Earlier, in  section 1, we noted t h a t  
Rosenthal’s theory is open to a one-component interpretation, 
according to  which, as Rosenthal says, “there can be something 
it’s like for one to be in a state with particular mental qualities, 
even if no such state occurs” (2005, 211). On this interpretation, 
contrary to the two-component view, the HOTs alone are taken 
to be sufficient for p-consciousness. A disjunctive strategy would 
allow Rosenthal to  employ a two-component version to account 
for the ordinary cases and nonradical confabulation cases, along 
with a one-component version to account for radical confabula- 
tion cases. The idea is that, on the one hand, Rosenthal can agree 
that in radical cases there are no first-order mental states, since 
the one-component view allows HOTs to play a sufficient role in 
explaining p-consciousness; on the other hand, he can maintain 
the two-component view for the rest of the cases. 
The first problem is that  this disjunctive strategy seems ad 
hoc. Rosenthal’s (e.g., 2005, 187-88) paradigm cases-for 
example, the wine taster who becomes conscious of fine-grained 
differences among sensory qualities by learning new concepts- 
are all bound to the two-component version. Even the cases of 
misrepresentation that he cites, as we have argued above, are 
bound to the two-component version: recall, typically misrepre- 
sentations are extrapolations from first-order sensory states. So 
these cases do not motivate the strategy. 
Moreover, the empirical scientists who invoke Rosenthal’s 
HOT theory in constructing explanations also work with a two- 
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component view. Weiskrantz (1997, 71-76; 1997, 203-4), for 
example, in proposing explanations of various neuropsycho- 
logical deficits, invokes HOT and sees it as largely consistent 
with his views on conscious experiences, but Weiskrantz does 
not treat HOTs as sufficient; instead, he sees HOTS-or some- 
thing similar to HOTS-as being only necessary for the sort of 
conscious experience tha t  is  lacking in  cases of blindsight, 
unilateral neglect, amnesia, aphasia, and so forth. Likewise for 
the research of Dienes and Perner (1999,2001, and 2002) who, 
despite noting that Rosenthal claims HOTs can be sufficient, 
only apply his analysis to cases in which first-order s ta tes  
actually obtain. And Rolls (2001, 245-65) develops a view 
dubbed HOLT (higher-order linguistic thought), a view tha t  
differs from Rosenthal only in placing greater emphasis on 
syntactic manipulation. But nothing in Rolls’s discussion or 
application suggests that  he regards HOLTs as sufficient; his 
hypothesis “is that  consciousness is the state which arises by 
virtue of having the ability to think about one’s own thoughts, 
which has the adaptive advantage of enabling one to correct 
long multistep syntactic plans” (2001, 258). This is a version of 
the two-component view. He nowhere considers the possibility of 
thinking about nonexistent thoughts, nor does he construct 
explanations of this sort; instead, his focus is clearly on the 
manner in which the higher-order and lower-order interact. 
Rosenthal (2005, 179) also reports on the research of Frith 
and Frith (1999), research tha t  includes reference to brain 
imaging studies of subjects asked to report on their mental 
states. Frith and Frith record that,  despite “wide variation in 
the nature of the states reported on, activity was observed in all 
these studies ... along the border between rostra1 anterior 
cingulated cortex and medial prefrontal cortex” (1999, p. 1693). 
Subjects were asked to monitor and report on pain, emotions, 
spontaneous thoughts, actions, and tickling. Rosenthal 
speculates that  the brain area activated in all these instances 
might be that which subserves HOTs. But even if this is true, it 
does not lend support to the sufficiency claim because the Frith 
and Frith data  all concern monitoring of actual first-order 
states. 
What these empirical cases suggest is tha t  a disjunctive 
strategy would be ad hoc. Paradigm cases-cases used to 
motivate serious consideration of HOT that actually offer some 
explanatory, predictive leverage-invoke two components. Even 
the cases of nonradical misrepresentation are best explained by 
a two-component view. What’s more, the empirical scientists 
who invoke HOTs in their explanations, or whose research is 
regarded by Rosenthal as being suggestive of the role that HOTs 
can play in explanation, are working with a two-component view. 
The one-component view has not been shown to be empirically 
well motivated; therefore, the disjunctive strategy seems ad hoc. 
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A second problem, one intimately related to the ad hoc 
problem, is tha t  the disjunctive strategy does not obviously 
provide any explanatory or predictive advantage. Although on 
the surface it may seem that AS accompanied by hallucination 
or schizophrenia in the congenitally deaf can be explained by 
the one-component version of HOT theory, perhaps reminiscent 
of the way in which Newtonian theory predicted the existence of 
Neptune and Pluto, such an interpretation would be misleading. 
The one-component version-markedly unlike the case with 
Newton-leaves absolutely no specific expectations concerning 
when targetless HOTs tha t  enable p-consciousness should 
occur.38 Wishful thinking, self-deception, and other standard 
cases of confabulation-that is, typical causes of misrepresen- 
tation (e.g., Rosenthal 2005, 125-26)-provide no reason for 
expecting AS accompanied by hallucinations or  schizophrenic 
voices in the congenitally deaf. Most people who are blind know 
that they are blind and they have no p-conscious visual experi- 
ences to suggest otherwise; standard forms of wishful thinking 
or self-deception provide no relief from their blindness, although 
delirium tremens might. The same can be said for the congeni- 
tally deaf: neither wishful thinking nor self-deception help them 
to hear, only schizophrenia does. Accordingly, not even our 
examples can be taken to suggest that  HOTs play a sufficient 
explanatory role. 
In other words, the most that  could be claimed on behalf of 
the disjunctive strategy when applied to our cases is that  the 
one-component view is conceptually consistent with them. But 
conceptual consistency can be purchased cheaply. The failure to 
indicate just  when we should expect wishful thinking, self- 
deception, o r  some other factor to give rise to what-it-is-like 
indicates t ha t  the one-component view does not obviously 
contribute anything substantial to the explanatory status of the 
HOT theory. 
A third problem is that the disjunctive strategy seems not to 
be falsifiable. A virtue, albeit a n  ironic one, of the  two- 
component view is that it is falsifiable. We say “ironic” because, 
if we are  correct, it now stands as  falsified by our counter- 
e x a m p l e ~ . ~ ~  Employment of the disjunctive strategy, even if ad 
hoc in the sense of being unmotivated by paradigm cases or 
empirical research and even if i t  provides no obvious grounds 
for expecting the phenomena that occur in the counterexamples, 
can at least contribute to the development of an  explanatory 
theory, if it  is cast in such a form as to be potentially falsifiable. 
But the one-component disjunct of the disjunctive strategy is 
not so cast. What we need, and do not yet have, is a reasonably 
clear statement of the conditions under which the disjunctive 
strategy could be empirically challenged. 
As we have said above, critics (e.g., Kriegel 2007) have found 
some of Rosenthal’s claims to be counterintuitive, especially his 
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claim tha t  people can be under the impression of being in  
conscious states tha t  they a re  not actually in. Importantly, 
Rosenthal agrees that such claims are counterintuitive. Because 
he cannot use intuition to  justify these claims, he must justify 
them in some other way. The way he chooses is justification in 
terms of a theory tha t  he believes t o  have sound empirical, 
explanatory credentials. And this is a way tha t  he needs in 
order to fend off worries pertaining to the alleged hard problem 
and the explanatory gap. But we are  here showing tha t  the 
HOT theory is not justified in claiming such credentials for 
itself. Therefore, the HOT theory is confronted with a serious 
challenge. 
In sum, although it might seem that a disjunctive strategy 
would enhance the HOT theory’s explanatory adequacy, such is 
not the case. Explanatory adequacy is not enhanced when the 
added option-in this case, the one-component option-is not 
empirically motivated by the paradigm cases or  by the way in 
which working scientists actually employ the theory. Ad hoc 
additions don’t help. Second, although the addition might well 
be conceptually consistent with our cases of radical confabu- 
lation, mere consistency doesn’t aid explanation. Third, the two- 
component view has  the virtue of falsifiability; the one- 
component view, in i ts  present form, does not. Obviously we 
have treated just lightly some difficult issues in the philosophy 
of science, but our intent is simply to show that the disjunctive 
strategy is suspect. To remove the shadow of suspicion from this 
strategy, at least if Rosenthal wishes to continue to promote the 
HOT theory as an explanatory theory for empirical science, he 
must accept the burden of showing tha t  the one-component 
version is not ad hoc, that it provides explanatory advantage, or 
that it is falsifiable. 
4. 
We conclude tha t  radical confabulation presents a serious 
problem for Rosenthal’s HOT theory. There seems t o  be a n  
important body of anomalous cases for which the HOT theory- 
either the two-component version or the disjunctive strategy- 
fails t o  provide any explanatory advantage. We wish to 
emphasize tha t  our intent is  not destructive. We share  an  
admiration for the effort t ha t  is  expended in  rising to the 
challenge of consciousness and seeking to devise an  empirical 
theory that  aims to handle even those aspects that  are often 
treated as being beyond the reach of science. Our task, as we 
approach it here, is to examine the explanatory adequacy of the 
proposed theory. Our hope is that  the discovery of anomalies 
leads to fruitful revision, the design of a more adequate theory 
of broader scope, enhanced consistency, and greater explanatory 
power.40 
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Notes 
The order of authorship was determined arbitrarily; this manuscript is 
completely collaborative. 
In  this paper we focus on Rosenthal’s version of HOT theory. For 
other versions of HOT theories of consciousness, see Rocco Gennaro 
2004. 
That we are not conscious of any mediating factors should not be 
taken to imply that there are no mediating factors. 
Natura l  language is nonessential  to t h e  formation of HOTS; 
hence, prelinguistic infants, feral children, and nonhuman animals are 
in principle capable of conscious experience. See Rosenthal 1991, 472- 
73, and 1997, 741-42. 
Rosenthal does though make a n  important distinction here: the 
claim is tha t  some mental states,  those tha t  exhibit “thin phenome- 
nality,” have qualitative properties, even though there is nothing tha t  
it is like for one to have said properties. Mental s ta tes  t h a t  exhibit 
“thick phenomenality,” by contrast, a re  s ta tes  tha t  have qualitative 
properties along with a what-it-is-like for one to have the experience 
(e.g., 2005, 190-92). Subliminal perception and the cocktail party effect 
are offered as illustrations of how, empirically, qualitative states can 
be independent of what-it-is-like. Below, whenever we use p-conscious- 
ness, we intend tha t  i t  be understood in  Rosenthal’s sense of “thick 
phenomenality.” 
Rosenthal does not endorse this characterization of his position; 
we further explain our position below. 
We don’t intend to belittle the significance of conceptual issues, 
but they trouble all scientific theories, and those theories-quantum 
mechanics, evolution by na tura l  selection, and so on-continue to 
generate fruitful inquiry in the domains for which they were designed. 
Prominent among such investigators have been Rolls (2001, 244- 
65), Weiskrantz (1997, 71-76), and Dienes and Perner (e.g., 1999). We 
will return to consideration of their work below. 
Of states that  possess the property of phenomenal consciousness, 
it is often said t h a t  it is l ike  something to have them (Farrell 1950; 
Sprigge 1971, 167-68; Nagel 1974). Notational variants of what-it-is- 
like-to-be include raw feels, qualia, experience, and subjective feel. 
Many hold t h a t  this  property can only be defined ostensively, such 
t h a t  it can only be pointed to i n  experience, as when you explain 
“sting” by saying how your hands feel when you hit  a fastball off the 
handle  or t h e  end of t h e  b a t  on a cold day. As a more formal 
alternative to ostension, Carruthers defines phenomenal consciousness 
as “events t h a t  we can recognize in  ourselves, non-inferentially, or 
‘straight off,’ in virtue of the ways in which they feel to us, or the ways 
in which they present themselves to us subjectively” (2000, 14). 
To take just  one example among these, pain, a property tha t  is 
typically regarded as being the most highly accessible to a subject, it is 
striking just  how many investigators of consciousness, representing 
varied theoretical perspectives and areas of specialization, countenance 
talk of unconscious, unnoticed, unexperienced, unfelt, or sub-clinical 
pains (e.g., Carruthers  2005, 185-86; Chalmers 1996, 17; Dartnall  
2001; Guttenplan 2000, 28; Searle 1992, 164-67; Tye 1995, 115 and 
2000, 182; Vertosick 2000,152 and 175; Wilkes 1993, 186). And though 
it is often said tha t  these are  incoherent or counterintuitive ways of 
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thinking about pain,  Lycan observes t h a t  “ordinary people qui te  
frequently speak of pains  t h a t  go unfelt ,  without a n y  sense of 
contradiction” (2003, 9 and 13). To convince skeptics, h e  h a s  even 
begun to compile examples of unfelt pain from the popular press. 
lo This example is frequently cited by Dennett (e.g., 1991, 61; 1996, 
13 and 95; and 1998, 351). 
According to Rosenthal’s “homomorphism theory,” “mental  
qualities are properties of states that  figure in the perceptual function- 
ing of a par t icular  sensory modality, and  whose similari t ies and  
differences are homomorphic to those which hold among the properties 
perceptible by t h a t  modality.” Rosenthal claims t h a t  t h e  homo- 
morphism theory provides the theoretical grounds for distin-guishing 
among the conscious, the  nonconscious but  mental, and the  merely 
physical. 
l2 Dennett’s (1991, 30-31, 337) observations concerning palate 
t ra ining for wine tas ters ,  aura l  t ra ining for musicians, and t h e  
experiences of an  apprentice piano tuner  mirror Rosenthal’s views. 
Rosenthal’s and Dennett’s theories converge in  many respects. 
Concerning their apparent differences see Rosenthal 2005, 321-35 and 
Dennett 2000. 
l3  In both personal communication and in recent publications (e.g., 
2005, 209-13), Rosenthal has explicitly pressed this point. 
l4 Rosenthal has emphasized this point in personal communication. 
l5 Those of us who live in  earthquake-prone regions are  perhaps 
more easily persuaded by this claim than those who do not. We have 
grown accustomed to not infrequent vibrations accompanied by fear, 
and the two combined are indeed painless. To those who don’t live in 
earthquake-prone regions, perhaps a ride on a roller coaster would 
suffice to persuade you. 
l6 The same is t rue for well-studied cases of the confabulation of 
intention (Wegner 2002, 171-86); af ter  t h e  completion of actions, 
people commonly revise what they think they intended, and there is 
no necessary reference to p-consciousness. 
l7 One of t h e  explanatory challenges t h a t  HOT seems, as yet,  
unable  to respond to  is  t h e  need to distinguish between dis t inct  
explananda: beliefs that  merely make reference to what-it-is-like and 
beliefs tha t  have an  actual what-it-is-like aspect. More will be said 
about this below. 
la Cf. also Rosenthal 2005, 211, where he makes the  same point 
concerning dental fear. 
In personal communication, Rosenthal has conceded that matters 
might not be so plain here. Again, we take this matter to be significant 
because, among other things, it seems to suggest that  the HOT theory 
carries more explanatory weight when targets exist, i.e., when there 
are two components. And we believe that radical cases of confabulation 
show that the two-component view fails. 
2o Also known as the Anton-Babinski Syndrome. 
21 Our discussion of hallucinations and pseudohallucinations in this 
and in the next paragraph is based on Davis 2004. 
22 We don’t concede this  point; we simply choose not to press it 
here. 
23 The patient in question did recognize some of his hallucinations 
as hallucinations. That  a hallucination is recognized as such by the 
subject does not imply that it is inconsistent with the three criteria for 
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hallucinations indicated in the text. 
24 At one point, Rosenthal entertained the possibility tha t  target- 
less HOTs would be both rare and pathological. He has since retreated 
from that position (2005, 29). Below we try to show that he was correct 
to revise the claim that such cases are rare. 
25 Yet more difficult cases could easily be cited here, e.g., the case of 
color-blind color vision among synesthetes who see numbers as tinged 
with hues (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2003, 57). But  each case 
involves distinctive complexities, and our only intention at this point 
is to suggest tha t  there is a family of cases tha t  seriously challenge 
the explanatory efficacy of HOT theory. 
26 If we are  describing this phenomenon accurately, this case too 
seems to lend support  to  a two-component view, albeit  a version 
wherein HOTs are  passively compliant to the demands of first-order 
sensory states. 
27 Rosenthal identifies this transition of his ideas in several places, 
e.g., 2005, 56n25. 
28 Rosenthal does propose an  evolutionary account of how it came 
to be t h a t  HOTs tend to accurately reflect actual first-order s ta tes  
(2005, 15-16, 218-19, 303-5). He argues t h a t  HOTs evolved as a 
means of attr ibuting mental  s ta tes  to others, at tr ibutions t h a t  a re  
based on behavioral observations and other stimuli; this talent for the 
at t r ibut ion of mental  s ta tes  was then  turned  inward. But  th i s  
argument doesn’t help his case here because it provides no reason to 
expect HOTs tha t  would be involved in enabling the deaf to hear  or 
the blind to see. Evolved capacities can fail to be adaptive, because the 
environment or informational inputs change (Buller 2005, 57). But on 
the HOT theory we have no reason to believe that  either has changed 
in such a way as to cause radical confabulation. 
29 I t  is  worth mentioning t h a t  there  is a significant tension 
between responding to \the problem of the rock by claiming that  HOTs 
target mental s ta tes  while simultaneously claiming tha t  HOTs can 
target nonexistents. How could targeting a nonexistent give rise to 
what-it-is-like when targeting a rock cannot? 
30 This is a point t h a t  he  has  emphasized in personal communi- 
cation. 
31 Our discussion here is drawn from Churchland 2002, 122-23. 
32 In  other  words, we a r e  saying t h a t  Rosenthal h a s  not yet 
succeeded in putting to rest the “problem of the rock.” 
33 For a defense of one version of t h e  disposit ional view, see 
Carruthers 2000 and 2005. 
34 Rosenthal concedes t h a t  when mental s ta tes  a re  conscious, “it 
seems phenomenologically tha t  there is no HOT present” (2005, 111). 
But he emphasizes tha t  the appearance is irrelevant, “because HOTs 
are posited as the best explanation of what it is for a mental state to 
be a conscious state.” And this is yet another reaffirmation tha t  the 
case for-or against-HOT needs to be made in terms of explanatory 
adequacy. 
35 Personal communication. 
36 I t  should be noted though t h a t  Dennett’s resistance to ta lk  of 
mental levels might reflect more a difference in terminology than in 
substance (e.g., Rockwell 1996). 
37 Here we are quoting Carruthers (2000, 206). 
38 The point is not to deny the  occurrence of improbable events; 
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rather, it is merely to say t h a t  when offering a n  explanation, some 
reason for expecting the improbable event should be stated, perhaps, 
for example, by describing relevant causal mechanisms (e.g., Railton 
1993). 
39 We don’t intend to deny Duhemian and other concerns pertaining 
to falsification. We appeal  t o  it here  merely as a n  (admittedly 
imperfect) constraint on the development of explanatory theories. 
*O We hereby express our heartfelt gratitude to David Rosenthal for 
his careful reading of and detailed comments on previous drafts of this 
paper. We also wish to express our gratitude to anonymous referees 
who motivated us to make apprpriate  revisions. Moreover, we are  
grateful  to par t ic ipants  i n  t h e  2007 LMPS Taipei Conference 
sponsored by the  National Taiwan University (April 27-28) and to 
par t ic ipants  in  t h e  Soochow University Conference on Analytic 
Philosophy ( J u n e  20-23, 2007) for their  many helpful comments. 
Especially worthy of note are  several constructive suggestions offered 
by Richard Fumerton, Eric Peng, Wen-fang Wang, and  Huei-Ying 
(Tony) Cheng. We have not agreed with or been persuaded by every 
comment or suggestion, but our understanding of the subject matter 
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